This book really, really ticked me off. I'm in the Houston airport yesterday and I see this book about an alternative history to the days after Pearl Harbor. The "alternative" is Japanese Navy commander in chief Yamamoto Isoruko personally commanding the strike on Pearl Harbor and deciding to send in a third strike on Pearl Harbor, which destroys the U.S. Pacific Fleet's fuel supplies, communications, and drydock facilities. He then hangs around to try to locate and destroy the U.S. carriers Enterprise and Lexington. Such a strike would have been far worse for the U.S. Navy than the destruction of the battle line in the first two strikes, as this book makes clear. I didn't realize till after I finished this book today (your first hint that I liked it) that the third strike actually occurs in the authors' Pearl Harbor: A Novel of December 8th, but as reader and sometime author on Pacific War topics, I was immediately interested in a book that posited the worst-case scenario for the Navy after Pearl Harbor (no fuel, communications or repair facilities, and an opponent led by a commander who was willing to fight) and relied on the Enterprise and Lexington - far and away this carrier enthusiast's favorite ships - to save the day.
As much as it infuriated me to buy a book by someone whose political views (at least some of) I dislike as much as I do Gingrich's (although we have similar historical tastes and I'd actually really like to have a beer with the guy and talk history), not to mention to endure what I assumed would be the political lecturing the book would contain (which was admittedly substantially tempered by my knowing that Gingrich thinks a lot of FDR) I just couldn't stand not reading about my beloved Enterprise and Lexington duking it out with the Japanese fleet. Maybe the Lexington would even survive!
To my surprise, the book was very, very good. It started out a little florid with FDR's internal thought processes having to lay out the situation, but quickly settled into a good solid narrative. It's uniformly well-written, and the authors are true - often painfully so - to the realities of what would have happened if the U.S. carriers had tried to pit their inexperienced aviators, with inadequate aircraft, and often worthless (literally) ordnance against the finest carrier fleet in the world. The pilots and crew facing almost insurmountable odds lose their bravado very quickly, and even the best toy with the idea of simply not going out to face almost certain death one more time. The accuracy of the fictional narrative and the quality of the writing made this a very good read indeed. The authors didn't flinch from the unpleasant reality of what would have happened if either carrier had tried to engage the Japanese, and as a result when you finish the book you feel like you have a good idea what really would have happened. One comment about the conversations between the political leaders. Reviewers of the previous book thought they weren't very good - I thought they were actually okay - and I particularly liked (oddly enough) the political background that was provided. It was probably something FDR continually thought about that his War and Navy secretaries were Republicans - the party which had been isolationist - and that they'd worked previously for cousin Teddy when he was president. And until the very end the book is - I have to admit - completely bereft of any political commentary or analogies to the present day. At the very end some of Yamamoto's thoughts that the U.S.'s war leadership might be made to dissolve into political infighting by reversals in the war can be read as applied to the current situation in Iraq, but they are also accurate to the man and to his nation's foreign policy at the time, which depended on such an outcome.
The factual narrative appears to be helped by an awareness of recent scholarship on the Pacific War, specifically the Lundstrom's Black Shoe Carrier Admiral and Parshall and Tully's Shattered Sword, which of which I have reviewed on my weblog recently. Both sides - but particularly the Americans - are constantly worrying about fuel, with the Americans horrified that the wartime usage rates are far worse than what they'd planned on. But it is Yamamoto that consistently takes risks with this issue - and the book doesn't go far enough in time to finish the story of whether he pays a price for it - although that could certainly start the next book in the series with a bang. The significance of fuel as a concern for fleet commanders is something we are only recently beginning to fully understand, and this book includes it, as it should.
The book does have a number of failings, however, all of which I track back to a need for additional editing, as well as a more thorough historical scrubbing. First of all, while the narrative was almost uniformly very good, there were times that the narrative dropped in facts that were not apparent to the viewpoint of the person whose experience was being narrated, thus damaged the "you are there" feel unnecessarily. The best example I can think of is when the destroyer Ward is hit while executing a torpedo attack on a Japanese battleship, the story is told from the perspective of the admiral on the bridge. While I think it's okay to point out that the ship then took a fatal hit, it isn't okay to observe that its valiant heart was stopped, and only twenty of its crew survived. That's probably an accurate observation - but not where it is included. There are some florid touches, as I mentioned, but not nearly what you'd expect. And the references to a character losing a hand on the Panay are repeated three times on two pages - I think we got the picture the first time. Those sorts of editing and continuity issues crop up, albeit only occasionally.
Several other historical errors - admittedly all (remarkably) minor are present. For example, the Enterprise air boss is Wade McCluskey, not McCloskey, as he's repeatedly named. The error is noticeable to readers, since six months later (in the real war) McCluskey, as Enterprise CAG, is the pilot who locates the Japanese fleet at Midway. The mounts on the Enterprise's bow were not 40mm until late 1943 - they were 20mm in 1942 and at this time I'm not sure they were there at all, and even if they were they were likely only .50 cals. More egregious was the reference to the Lexington (and perhaps the Enterprise too - the narrative is unclear) having giant hull numbers painted on the deck. Such numbers didn't come into use until late 1943. The cover photo as well, while an ingenious computer enhancement (flipped and bow wave added) of a well-know picture of the Lexington in late 1942, is also not only inaccurate as to the Lexington's starboard side, it's also the wrong camouflage for December 8, and misses using a picture of the Lexington that is from exactly the same angle, with the right camouflage and a bow wave already present - in other words it used the lower instead of the upper of the attached images from p. of the Warships Pictorial #11 on the Lexington class carriers.
(Admittedly the captions to the attached aren't clear as to which camo is later, but when you look at pictures of the camo being painted over in March 1942 it's clear that the Ms. 12 two-color scheme had to be the later one). All of these could have been corrected with a little more editing, and probably no one except me, who's studied these sorts of things in detail for books and modelmaking purposes would notice.
The most important thing about these errors is probably how minor they are - the plot, the characters, the factual detail, what the characters do is all so well handled that it's nitpicking to complain about any of it. None of it detracted from the story, certainly.
In the end, I thought this was a really good book, and I am looking forward to reading the next installment. I might even go back and pick up the first one. And for a book by Newt Gingrich, that's really saying a lot.