Eastern District of Texas Federal Court Practice

Boy, I Say Boy, A Chicken Producer, a Bank and an Appraiser Are Not An Enterprise In Fact Under RICO, You Hear Me? Are You Listenin' to Me Boy? (Concluding Squawk)

Do v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 512 F.Supp.2d 764, RICO Bus.Disp.Guide 11,339 (E.D.Tex. Aug 10, 2007) (NO. CIV.A.9:05CV238(TH))
Judge: Thad Heartfield
Holding: Motion for Summary Judgment GRANTED
It seems only yesterday (actually it was August 9, 2006) that Judge Heartfield declined to dismiss the RICO claims in this case, holding that the issues raised by the motions were better addressed at the summary judgment stage.  Well, here we are.  In this opinion Judge Heartfield held that a chicken producer, bank and appraiser were not an association in fact enterprise under RICO, and accordingly granted summary judgment on these claims.

Not Cruel and Unusual Enough: Refusal to Serve Coffee to Inmates Not a Constitutional Violation

Mujwid v. Kitchen Captain, 2007 WL 1886225(E.D.Tex. Jun 29, 2007) (NO. 1:07-CV-252)
Judge: Thad Heartfield/Keith Giblin
I typically don't post on inmate cases, but thought that there might be some interest in law firms as to whether deprival of coffee constitutes a constitutional violation.
Plaintiff alleged that the second shift Kitchen Captain at the Stiles Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, discriminates against the inmates in administrative segregation by failing to serve them coffee daily. Plaintiff also contended that the food is not made properly and the drinks served at lunch and dinner are watered down.  Plaintiff contends that the trays are cold because the warmer does not work properly, and that there are prison policies governing these aspects of the food service, but that the second shift Kitchen Captain is not following those policies.
Judge Giblin reviewed the inmate's civil rights action and recommended that it should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Infringing Barbie? The Magical World of Wishes and Dreams Goes 8-6 against Barbie's Fairytopia in 12(b)(6) Throwdown in Eastern District

McArdle v. Mattel Inc., 2006 WL 2668860(E.D.Tex. Sep 13, 2006) (NO. 1:06-CV-103)
Judges: Thad Heartfield & Earl S. Hines
Holding: Motion to Dismiss GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.  Specifically, (1) author's claims for breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation were not preempted by the Copyright Act; (2) the Copyright Act preempted author's claims for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and misappropriation; (3) author's allegations were insufficient to state a breach-of-confidential-relationship claim; (4) author's allegations were sufficient to assert a trade dress infringement claim; (5) toy company's alleged conduct of copying author's product, and then giving purchasers the false impression that its product line was different than author's product was not actionable as reverse passing off; (6) author failed to plead fraud action with the required particularity; (7) author stated a claim for negligent misrepresentation; (8) court was without jurisdiction to consider author's claim against Barbie for negligent use of pixie dust, and reserved ruling (with regrets) on author's motion for summary judgment in his favor due to the entire concept of a Barbie with butterfly wings and pixie outfits being insanely annoying and deeply silly.
In this case a children's book author (“The Magical World of Wishes and Dreams”) (see http://www.magicalwb.com/home.htm) sued toy company Mattel, alleging that its "Barbie's “Fairytopia-Make a Magical World” line of products infringed his federally protected copyrights and trademarks, and asserting numerous state law claims, including negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied contract, trade dress infringement, and fraud. Mattel filed a motion to dismiss on various grounds.
Judge Heartfield adopted the report and recommendations of Judge Hines as noted above, paring down the "smorgasbord" of 14 claims asserted in the Plaintiff's complaint to eight in a report that is a pretty good summary of every conceivable intellectual property cause of action except patent infringement.

Texas Medicaid Hearing Procedures Deprived Disabled Plaintiff of Benefits Without Due Process

Jonathan C. v. Hawkins, 2006 WL 3498494(E.D.Tex. Dec 05, 2006) (NO. CIV A 9:05-CV-43)
Judge: Thad Heartfield, C.J.
Holding: Order on Motions for Summary Judgment
COMMENTS:
This case arises out of a dispute over the services provided to a severely disabled youth by the Texas Medicaid Program.  "At the heart of this case," Judge Heartfield wrote, "is whether the Texas Medicaid fair hearing process complies with the Federal Medicaid Act and corresponding regulations."  The youth's rights were violated because he was not properly afforded the notice of the reduction of his benefits or the opportunity to challenge TMHP's decision while the benefits were maintained pending the fair hearing and ultimate decision, Judge Heartfield held.  Accordingly, he granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant's.

RICO Meets East Texas Chicken Farming - opening squawk

Do v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., 2006 WL 2290556(E.D.Tex. Aug 09, 2006) (NO. CIV.A. 9:05CV238)
Judge: Chief Judge Thad Heartfield
Division: Lufkin
Holding: Motion to Dismiss GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
COMMENTS:
According to the opinion, plaintiffs alleged the following scheme:
(1) Advertise chicken farm with promises of long term contracts by Pilgrim's Pride. Require the buyer to use specific bankers and appraisers who will confirm a grossly inflated price for the property;
(2) Reward the Bankers and Appraisers with a steady stream of farmers selling and buying Pilgrim's Pride farms-they will get appraisal costs, and closing costs;
(3) Arbitrarily demand and extract capital improvements from the farmers until you get all you can out of them;
(4) Terminate the contract with the farmer, rendering the farm worthless;
(5) Once the farmer is in this position, give him the option to participate in the scheme or foreclose on the house at a lower price; and
(6) Return to step one.
If this sounds familiar, you must have read Upton Sinclair's The Jungle in college.  Each Defendant separately moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Racketeering Influence and Corrupt Organization Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. (“RICO”), claims and all of Plaintiffs' state law claims.  Judge Heartfield held that the plaintiffs had stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under RICO and, given the nature of the claims, the pleadings are sufficiently clear. Because it was not disputed that federal question jurisdiction was proper under the RICO statutes, the court concluded that jurisdiction was also proper. The motions raised issues that may be properly considered at the summary judgment stage, the Court concluded. Accordingly, Judge Heartfield declined to dismiss the entire case at this time - only Plaintiff Julie Do's claim for breach of contract.

(Photo of generic chickens not known to be related in any way to the pending litigation courtesy of Farm Sanctuary - http://www.sentientbeings.org )

Dismissal for failure to serve defendant

SANTAMARIA v. TODD INS. AGENCY, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38587 (E.D. Tex. 2005)
Judge: Chief Judge Thad Heartfield
Division: Lufkin
Holding: Case dismissed for failure to effect service
COMMENTS:
The plaintiff in this case filed suit alleging employment discrimination. Because there was no docket entry indicating that service of the defendant was ever issued, waived or otherwise effected, the Court entered a Show Cause Order directing plaintiff to serve defendant, file a notice of dismissal pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(I) or show good cause for her failure to do so.  Subsequent to entry of that order, no action was taken by plaintiff.  Judge Heartfield noted that plaintiffs are responsible for serving the summons and complaint on all defendants no later than 120 days after suit is filed, and that courts have discretion to dismiss actions where there is no showing of good cause for a plaintiff's failure to timely serve defendant with notice of suit.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m). According, after making factual findings that the plaintiff had not  been diligent in prosecuting her case, had failed to comply with the rules regarding service of suit, and had  disobeyed the court's orders directing plaintiff to serve defendant, file a notice of dismissal pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1)(I) or show good cause for her failure to do so, and finding that dismissal of plaintiff's case is the only effective sanction available given her failure to comply with the lesser sanction of conditional dismissal imposed by order dated March 23, 2005, the Court dismissed the case.

No diversity - motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction granted

Lytle v. Aspen Educ. Group, No. 9:04-CV-228, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28285, November 10, 2005
Judge:  Chief Judge Thad Heartfield
Division: Lufkin
Holding: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction GRANTED
COMMENTS:
This is a tort case arising from a student's attendance at an outdoor therapy camp near Groveton, Texas.  Aspen and Lone Star filed motions to dismiss claiming lack of personal jurisdiction over Aspen, lack of diversity jurisdiction, and failure to join an indispensable party.  Judge Heartfield granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and thus did not need to address the other grounds.   Plaintiffs are both Texas residents. Lone Star, a wholly owned subsidiary of Aspen, is incorporated in Delaware and runs the wilderness camp at issue. Defendants maintain that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because Lone Star's principal place of business is in Texas, making it a Texas resident.  Plaintiffs contend that Lone Star's principal place of business is in California.  Judge Heartfield applied the "total activities" test to determine where Lone Star's principal place of business was, and concluded that it was in fact Texas, and therefore jurisdiction was lacking.  While the company's headquarters was in California, its only place of business was Texas.