Eastern District of Texas Federal Court Practice

Motions for Summary Judgment Granted in Part in ERISA Case

Abate v. Hartford, 471 F.Supp.2d 724 (E.D.Tex. Jul 27, 2006) (NO. CIV.A. 1:05-CV-690)
Judge: Marcia Crone
Holding: Motions for Summary Judgment Granted in Part
Hartford moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim that its decision to terminate payment of his long term disability benefits constituted an abuse of discretion. The plaintiff also sought summary judgment on his claim that Hartford abused its discretion in terminating his benefits in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (“ERISA”).  Judge Crone ruled that Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied, Hartford's Motion to Strike should be denied, the plaintiff's Motions to Supplement the Administrative Record should be granted, and the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied as premature in light of the remand of this case to the plan administrator.

Workers' Comp-Related Case Remanded

Jones v. Ace American Ins. Co., 2006 WL 3826998(E.D.Tex. Dec 22, 2006) (NO. CIV A 106-CV-616)
Judge: Marcia Crone
Holding: Motion to Remand GRANTED
Judge Crone rejected the defendants' "fraudulent joinder" (also called "improper joinder" in the Fifth Circuit) claim with respect to one of the named defendants and remanded this case to state court.

Motion to Remand Denied

Nixon v. Wheatley, 368 F.Supp.2d 635 (E.D.Tex. 2005)
Judge: Crone
Division: Beaumont
Holding: Motion to Remand DENIED
COMMENTS:
Judge Crone held that 1) a twenty-one day delay in sending a file-stamped copy of the Notice of Removal to the state court did not waive removal; 2) sending limited discovery before and after removal does not waive the right to remove; and 3) all removing defendants do not need to personally sign the Notice of Removal, so long as they are represented by the same counsel who acts on their behalf. 

Summary Judgment Denied in Polio Vaccine Case: Newspaper Articles & Hearsay

HICKS v. CHARLES PFIZER & CO., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40660 (E.D. Tex., Sept. 29, 2005)
Judge: Marcia Crone
Division: Beaumont
Holding: Motion for Summary Judgment DENIED
COMMENTS:
Pfizer sought summary judgment on Plaintiffs' personal injury action asserting claims for products liability, negligence, fraud, and breach of warranty, arising out of Plaintiff's ingestion of oral polio vaccine ("OPV"). The Hicks contend that the vaccine caused Karen Hicks to develop two, non-malignant, brain tumors. The case focused on the application of the hearsay rules to 1962 newspaper articles which suggested that Pfizer manufactured the OPV in question.  Judge Crone held that these were sufficient to raise a material issue of fact, precluding the entry of summary judgment in favor of Pfizer.

Summary judgment granted in Fair Labor Standards Act case

Hesseltine v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 391 F.Supp.2d 509 (E.D. Tex. 2005)
Judge: Marcia Crone
Division: Sherman
Holding: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment GRANTED
COMMENTS:
This is a Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 206 et seq. case alleging that Goodyear did not pay overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA. 

Judge Crone found that the plaintiffs' "person to person" claims of ten to fifteen minutes per shift were the equivalent of 1.4% to 2.1% of work time on a twelve-hour shift, and thus even if time performing shift relief constituted compensable work time under the FLSA, after weighing the relevant factors, Plaintiffs' claims for ten minutes or less were de minimis as a matter of law.  With respect to the second claim for time expended in connection with early or late shift relief and when attending safety meetings, the plaintiff could not quantify the amount of time he worked, and did not follow Goodyear's procedure to receive overtime pay, thus Judge Crone found that he had not provided definite and certain evidence that he performed work for which he was not compensated.  Finally, Judge Crone noted that even if the claims did constitute unpaid overtime, Goodyear was entitled to a credit or offset for paying workers a premium for working over 8 hours a shift.  For example, even assuming that the plaintiffs had approximately one hour per week of unpaid overtime, Goodyear had approximately four hours to offset against the plaintiffs due to its premium payments, and thus it had a defense, which Judge Crone found it had not waived and was not estopped from asserting, even if the court had not determined the claims to be de minimus.

No Adverse Employment Action Shown in Race Discrimination Case

Thompson v. Exxon Mobil Corp., --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2004 WL 2580678 (E.D.Tex. Oct 25, 2004) (NO. CIV.A.1:02-CV-693)
Judge: Crone
Division:Beaumont
Holding: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment GRANTED
COMMENTS:
Defendant sought summary judgment on the Plaintiffs' claims for racial discrimination and retaliation.  Judge Crone granted the motion, holding that under the disparate treatment standard, while the Plaintiffs had established the first two elements of a prima facie case, i.e., they are members of a protected class and they are qualified for the positions they hold, they had not established the third and fourth elements, i.e., that they suffered an adverse employment action or that others outside the class who are similarly situated were treated more favorably.
Practice Tip:  Judge Crone noted that while the Plaintiffs asserted several claims in their pleadings, they only addressed two  in their response to the summary judgment motion, even though the motion itself challenged all of the claims asserted. Consequently, the court deemed the Plaintiffs to have abandoned the remainder of their claims by failing to raise them in their responsive brief

Summary judgment denied on untimely filing and substantive grounds in "reduction in force" sexual discrimination case

Taylor v. County Bancshares, Inc., 325 F.Supp.2d 755 (E.D.Tex.2004) (NO. CIV.A.1:03 CV 0023)
Judge: Crone
Division: Beaumont
Date: July 14, 2004
Holding: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment DENIED
COMMENTS:
This is a sexual harassment case in which the plaintiff's employer moved for summary judgment claiming that the suit was filed untimely and that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the claim itself.
Judge Crone denied the motion, holding that there were fact issues as to whether the employee had notice that the EEOC had issued a right-to-sue letter, and thus summary judgment was not proper on this basis. She also denied the motion on the claim itself, finding that the employee had made a prima facie case case of discrimination in a "reduction in force" context, in this case meaning that the employee was qualified for the position and that another person outside the protected class remained in a similar position following the reduction in force, and that there were fact issues as to whether the employer's stated reasons for terminating the plaintiff were a pretext.