Eastern District of Texas Federal Court Practice

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendant's Designation of Responsible Third Parties Denied

Flanagan v. Wells Fargo Financial Nat. Bank, 2009 WL 2143439, E.D.Tex. July 14, 2009)
Judge: Amos Mazzant
Holding: Plaintiff's Objection to and Motion to Strike Defendant's Designation of Responsible Third Parties DENIED
Judge Schneider adopted Judge Mazzant's ruling in this case, which mentions the recent Texas "responsible third party" practice under Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code § 33.004.
This dispute arises out of Defendant's handling of a credit card account that was in Plaintiff's name, which Plaintiff asserts was fraudulently obtained. Plaintiff filed suit asserting that Defendant's unreasonable collection efforts caused him damages under the Texas Debt Collections Practices Act, Fair Debt Collections Practices Act (“FDCPA”), Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), as well as for libel, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malice, negligence and gross negligence.
The defendant filed a third party complaint against the plaintiff's wife (I think it is) and father, and designated them as responsible third parties (RTP).  The plaintiff moved to strike the designation as responsible third parties.  Judge Mazzant denied the motion, finding sufficient facts alleged to bring the third party claim, and also denied the motion to sever the third party claim at this time.
But what isn't clear to me is why the designation or motion were filed in the first place - the defendant actually joined the Flanagans to the case as third parties, so the designation as responsible third parties was superfluous.  What the new Texas RTP procedure permits is a defendant to name a nonparty it believes has some responsibility for a plaintiff's injuries but whom the plaintiff did not sue (including bankrupts or entities over whom the court does not have jurisdiction) and have the jury assess a percentage of responsibility against that nonparty, which has the effect of reducing the percentage remaining to be assessed against the defendant.  (It reminds me of the famous Cadaver Synod (or Synodus Horrenda) back in 897 where Pope Formosus who was out of favor - and dead since the previous year - was dug up, his rotting corpse put in a chair, and tried for violations of canon law by his successor, Stephen VI.  Formosus, who unsurprisingly was not very vocal in his own defense (he did have a deacon appointed to represent him, but I doubt he was very vocal when the prosecuting attorney was, uh, the current pope) was found guilty, but the blowback was pretty severe - by the end of the year Stephen was deposed, imprisoned and strangled, and Formosus' corpse, after a brief burial and trip down the Tiber, was reinterred in St. Peter's). 
Back to RTP practice.  What the RTP procedure does not do is make the RTP a party to the case or impose any liability on them, including any res judicata effect from the prior trial.  (As opposed to Formosus, who lost three fingers off his right hand and stripping of the papal vestments, plus the aforementioned burial and temporary slumber with the fishes).  The principal difference between naming and joining (which is what the defendant did here) is that the defendant can actually place liability on the third party and recover from them if it is found to be liable if it joins them to the action as the defendant did here. 
Perhaps the defendant simply belt and suspender-ed the third parties.  In either event, Judge Mazzant focused on whether the real claim - the third party claim, not the RTP - was properly party of the case, and found that it was.
Tomorrow I'll discuss how the new method of counting days under the federal rules is similar to Vatican II.  Or an episode of Star Trek - I haven't decided which.

Motion to Transfer Venue from Sherman to California Denied

Worldpak Intern., LLC v. Diablo Valley Packaging, Inc., 2009 WL 1708080(E.D.Tex. Jun 16, 2009) (NO. 4:08CV469)
Judge: Michael Schneider/Amos Mazzant
Holding: Motion to Transfer Venue DENIED
This is a tortious interference with contract case between two businesses brought in Judge Michael Schneider's court in Sherman.  Judge Schneider accepted Magistrate Judge Amos Mazzant's report and recommendation that the defendant's motion to transfer the case from Sherman to California be denied. 
Notably, the plaintiff in this case is located in Plano, Texas, so while the defendant and its documents were in CA, the plaintiff and its were a few miles down the road from the courthouse in Texas.  The other factors were similarly either split or neutral, thus Judge Mazzant recommended - and Judge Schneider agreed - that the motion be denied.

Motion to Dismiss or Transfer for Improper or Inconvenient Venue Denied

GBS Development, Inc. v. West, 2009 WL 1703217(E.D.Tex. Jun 18, 2009) (NO. CIV A 5:09-CV-39(DF))
Judge: David Folsom
Holding: Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue DENIED.
This is a securities case in which the defendant sought a transfer to Dallas claiming that venue was not proper, as well as that a transfer was proper under 1404 for convenience grounds.  Judge Folsom rejected the first assertion, noting that part of the claimed acts occurred in the district.  As for the second, the Court noted that several of the plaintiffs were located in Arkansas, near Texarkana, thus a transfer would inconvenience them, although it would convenience (I think that's now officially a verb) the defendants.  But in fact, Texarkana was actually the most convenient location for the claimed witnesses, since some were east of it, and some west, so a transfer to Dallas would be a pronounced step backwards when it came to witness convenience. 
According, the Court concluded that "the Eastern District of Texas is a proper venue for this action. In addition, given the specific facts and circumstances of this case, only one factor-local interest-weighs slightly in favor of transfer. All the other factors do not weigh in favor of transfer or weigh strongly against transfer. When all of these factors are considered collectively, the Court concludes Defendants has failed to clearly demonstrate that the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas would be a more convenient venue than the Texarkana Division of the Eastern District of Texas."  (Emphasis in original).